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Anna Johnston*

Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation:
An Unsurprising Loss for Pharmaceutical Sales
Representatives and an Erosion of Power for
Administrative Agencies

I. Introduction
In Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation,1 the Supreme Court
deliberated whether pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs) were exempted
from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (FLSA) overtime pay requirement, and whether
the Department of Labor’s (Department) opinion set forth in an amicus brief on
the issue was owed controlling deference.2 The Court held that the Department was
not owed controlling deference3 and that the outside salesman exemption to
overtime pay applied to PSRs.4
The Court’s emphasis on the element of “fair warning” in determining the level
of deference owed to an administrative agency’s interpretation of its own
regulations erodes administrative agencies’ interpretative power when it matters
and preserves that power when it does not. The majority opinion degrades
administrative agencies’ previously-recognized ability to offer controlling
interpretations in legal briefs.5 The Court effectively limited Auer deference6 to only
official interpretations that pre-date the challenged issue or those interpretations of
© 2013 Anna Johnston
* J.D. 2013, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; B.A. Public Health Studies 2009, Johns
Hopkins University. I would like to thank both my past and present colleagues of the Journal of Business &
Technology Law for their comments, feedback, support, and hard work, and to extend a special thank you to my
family and friends for their support during law school.
1. 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
2. Id. at 2165.
3. Id. at 2168–69 (holding that the Department was not owed controlling deference as to the regulations it
validly promulgated); see also infra Part III.C.1.
4. Id. at 2174.
5. See Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 878 (2011) (“[W]e conclude that the text of the
regulation is ambiguous, and that deference is warranted to the interpretation of that text advanced by the
Board in its amicus brief.”).
6. See infra Part III.C.1.

Journal of Business & Technology Law Proxy

23

Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.
clear regulations. Accordingly, the Christopher decision proscribes Auer deference
from agency interpretations in amicus briefs of ambiguous regulations that have
multiple reasonable interpretations.

II. The Case
Plaintiffs Michael Shane Christopher and Frank Buchanan worked for
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) as PSRs. They were responsible for marketing and
promoting GSK products to physicians and encouraging physicians to prescribe
GSK products to their patients (commonly called “detailing” in the industry).7 As
PSRs employed by GSK, the Plaintiffs received extensive specialized training. The
training included how to: drive sales for each promoted drug, organize sales calls to
maximize results, and sell through customer-focused dialogue in order to get the
best possible commitment to prescribe.8 A PSR’s salary can be as much as $100,000
a year, generally composed of seventy-five percent base salary and twenty-five
percent incentive compensation.9 While it is not possible to link a PSR’s detailing
activities to a particular patient filling a prescription, incentive pay in the form of
commission is partly based on the number of prescriptions written by physicians in
a PSR’s assigned geographic region.10
The Plaintiffs asserted that they regularly worked over forty hours per week
without receiving overtime compensation, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §
207.11 The Plaintiffs contended that their job consisted of primarily promotional or
educational work, not selling; the Plaintiffs cited regulations prohibiting the direct
sale of prescription drugs to support their claim that they cannot conduct sales
within the meaning of the FLSA, and therefore could not be exempt from overtime
pay as outside salesmen.12
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona held that the outside
salesman exemption applied and granted the pharmaceutical company’s motion for

7. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. CV-08-1498-PHX-FJM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108992,
at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2009), aff’d, 635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). The employees
spent a majority of their time away from their employer’s offices because they were out meeting with physicians.
Id. at *3.
8. Id. at *6.
9. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 388 (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 08 Civ. 1498
(FJM), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108992, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2009)); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., No. CV-08-1498-PHX-FJM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108992, at *6–7 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2009), aff’d, 635
F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). Plaintiffs’ incentive compensation ranged from twentysix percent to forty-one percent of their total annual compensation. Id. at 7.
10. Id.
11. Id. at *2.
12. Id. at *7–8. When meeting with physicians, PSRs are confined to scripts and “core messages” that are
created by the company, in order to stay within the confines of federal law regulating the drugs. Christopher v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 386 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
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summary judgment.13 After reviewing PSRs’ duties and payment structure, the court
concluded that, in such a highly regulated industry, obtaining a commitment from
physicians to prescribe the marketed product is the closest PSRs can get to selling
prescription drugs.14 The court relied upon the fact that the FLSA and the
Department’s regulations broadly define “sale.”15 Additionally, the court noted that
all of the reasons for exempting outside salesmen from overtime pay were
applicable to PSRs.16
Three months later, the district court ruled on the Plaintiff’s motion to amend
the judgment. The Plaintiffs filed a copy of the Department’s amicus brief from a
similar case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit17 and
contended that the position taken by the Department was owed controlling
deference in the case before the district court. (Courts apply the standards set forth
in Chevron, Auer, and Skidmore to determine what level of deference an agency’s
opinion is owed.18) The district court found that the Department was not entitled to
Chevron deference because the opinion was in an amicus brief and not in a
regulation promulgated in accordance with the notice-and-comment procedures
required by the Administrative Procedure Act.19 The district court further reasoned
that the amicus brief was not owed Auer deference because the regulations simply
restated the terms of the statute, and the court concluded that the Department had
no special authority to interpret its own regulations in that instance.20

13.

Christopher, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108992, at *14.
Id. at *13–14.
15. Id. at *13.
16. Id. at *14.
17. Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, In re Novartis
Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 09-0437-cv). In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation
considered whether either the administrative employee exemption or the outside salesman exemption apply to
PSRs and was argued in the Second Circuit in February of 2010. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d
141 (2d Cir. 2010), abrogated by Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012); see also infra
Part III.C.
18. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452 (1997); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Administrative deference is of three different types:
1) Chevron deference is applied to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, and the agency interpretation
of the statute in question is generally binding on the court; 2) Auer deference is also a controlling deference and
is applied to agency interpretations of the agency’s own ambiguous regulations; 3) Skidmore deference is a lowlevel, non-binding deference that simply recognizes that an agency has expertise and a policy setting role. See
infra Part III.C.1.
19. Christopher, No. CV-08-1498-PHX-FJM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12813, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 1, 2010).
20. Id. at *3; see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“Interpretations such as those
in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.”). But see Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1997) (explaining that the fact that the Department’s interpretation came in the
form of a legal brief did not, under the circumstances of the case, make it unworthy of deference).
14.
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The district court’s decision was appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
where the Secretary of the Department of Labor filed a brief as amicus curiae in
support of Christopher and Buchanan.21 The Department opined that while PSRs’
work might resemble selling, they do not in fact make sales because the actual sale
of prescription drugs occurs “between the company and distributors (and then to
the pharmacy).”22 The Department concluded that PSRs only engage in non-exempt
promotional work — work that is incidental to sales, not in conjunction with sales,
because PSRs cannot “sell” drugs — and therefore PSRs cannot meet the primary
duties test for the outside salesman exemption.23
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Department’s opinion and affirmed the
district court’s decision that PSRs are not entitled to overtime pay. The Ninth
Circuit determined that the Department was not owed deference and that PSRs are
exempted from overtime pay as outside salesmen.24 The court determined the
Department’s opinion could not be owed Chevron deference because the opinion
was unreasonable. The court then relied on Gonzales v. Oregon to determine that
the Department was not owed even Auer deference.25 The court reasoned that when
an agency merely paraphrases statutory language, instead of using its expertise and
experience to formulate a regulation, the agency is not entitled to deference to
interpret its own words.26 Additionally, the court found that the Department’s brief
was a re-interpretation of the FLSA language.27 Therefore, the Department’s opinion
was not owed even low-level Skidmore deference.28

21. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012);
Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-15257).
22. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 21, at 10. The relevant regulations define sales as “the transfer of title
to tangible property, and in certain cases, of tangible and valuable evidences of intangible property . . . .” 29
C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (2012); Brief for the Secretary, supra note 21, at 8.
23. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 21, at 8–9; see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.503(a) (2012) (“Promotion work
is one type of activity often performed by persons who make sales, which may or may not be exempt outside
sales work, depending upon the circumstances under which it is performed. Promotional work that is actually
performed incidental to and in conjunction with an employee’s own outside sales or solicitations is exempt
work. On the other hand, promotional work that is incidental to sales made, or to be made, by someone else is
not exempt outside sales work.”).
24. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 392 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156
(2012) (holding the Department was not owed any deference); id. at 385 (holding the outside salesman
exemption applied). The court did not address the administrative employee exemption since the issue was not
raised on appeal.
25. See id. at 392, 395 & n.7 (finding the Department’s interpretation unpersuasive); id. at 394–95 (citing
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006)).
26. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 393–94.
27. Id. at 395.
28. Id. at 400. Not all justices believe in the merits of Skidmore deference. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1340 & n.6 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (commenting that the
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In addition to finding the Department’s opinion was not owed any deference,
the Ninth Circuit also explained why the Department’s position was unacceptable.
The court noted that the Department’s seventy years of acquiescence to the
pharmaceutical industry’s practice of not paying overtime wages supported a
finding that PSRs are not entitled to it.29 The court went on to hold that the outside
salesman exemption applied to PSRs.30 In support of that decision, the court
recognized that the FLSA is ambiguous given that it is not an industry specific
statute.31 Therefore, the court reasoned that under the FLSA a PSR’s role in
obtaining commitments to prescribe was more akin to selling than promoting.32
Additionally, the commission-based compensation scheme further supported a
finding that PSRs were indeed selling.33
The Supreme Court of the United States granted a writ of certiorari to determine
how much deference is owed to the Department’s opinion and whether the outside
salesman exemption applied to PSRs.34

III. Legal Background
A combination of statutes and regulations govern whether or not PSRs are entitled
to overtime pay. The FLSA is a broad, generally applicable, remedial statute that
requires overtime pay for employees who work over forty hours a week, with
limited exceptions.35 There are two FLSA exemptions that are potentially relevant to
PSRs: 1) the administrative employee exemption, and 2) the outside salesman
exemption.36 Congress did not define these exemptions, but rather gave the
Department the authority to define and delimit the exemptions by regulation.37 The
FLSA was drafted in a generally applicable, broad fashion that was legislatively
convenient, but makes it difficult to apply to non-traditional jobs and employment

majority opinion applied “so-called Skidmore deference” and in a footnote, expounding that “this doctrine (if it
can be called that) is incoherent, both linguistically and practically”).
29. Id. at 399.
30. Id. at 401.
31. Id. at 398.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 760 (2011).
35. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (2006).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006).
37. Id. (establishing the outside salesman exemption and stating that it shall be “defined and delimited
from time to time by regulations of the Secretary”); 29 U.S.C. § 204 (2006) (naming the Department of Labor as
the administrator of the FLSA). There is almost no legislative history related to the exemptions, which have
been part of the FLSA since its enactment. See Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive,
Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22122, 22123 (Apr. 23,
2004) (“Although section 13(a)(1) was included in the original FLSA enacted in 1938, specific references to the
exemptions in the legislative history are scant.”).
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schemes.38 For example, there are many statutes regulating prescription drugs that
constrain how PSRs can perform their job duties, which create legal anomalies that
are not present in standard employment scenarios.39 These abnormalities make
applying the FLSA to PSRs difficult. Indeed, notwithstanding the regulations
promulgated by the Department explaining these exemptions, three federal circuit
courts disagreed over whether PSRs were exempt as either administrative employees
or outside salesmen.40 Furthermore, the courts disagreed about how much
deference was owed to the Department’s opinion about the applicability of the
exemptions to PSRs.41
A. The FLSA Unequivocally Governs Overtime Compensation but Is Not Readily
Applicable to Non-Traditional Employees
The FLSA requires employers to compensate employees who work longer than forty
hours a week with time-and-a-half overtime pay.42 There are two exemptions to the
FLSA’s overtime pay requirement that could apply to PSRs: (1) the outside
salesman exemption, which exempts employees who primarily sell products away
from their employer’s place of business;43 and (2) the administrative employee
exemption, which exempts high income-earning employees who have management
or business operations oriented jobs.44 Before the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Christopher, there was a three-way circuit split regarding whether either of these
two exemptions applied to PSRs.45 It is important to note that only one exemption
need apply to PSRs in order preclude overtime pay.

38. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 635 F.3d 383, 398 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156
(2012) (explaining that the FLSA is not an industry-specific statute so it is important to consider the legislative
intent of the provisions).
39. See infra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
40. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 385 (holding that PSRs are exempt as outside salesmen); In re Novartis Wage &
Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 143–44 (2d Cir. 2010), abrogated by Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S.
Ct. 2156 (2012) (holding that PSRs are not exempt as either administrative employees or outside salesmen);
Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that PSRs are exempt as administrative
employees).
41. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 393–94; In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d at 153; see also infra notes
76–86 and accompanying text. The Department did not file a brief in the Third Circuit case Smith v. Johnson &
Johnson.
42. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (2006). The FLSA was originally enacted to
protect the working class from treatment and quality of life by requiring a minimum wage and overtime pay
after forty hours of work. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message from the President of the United States, H.R. DOC. NO.
255, at 1–2 (1937). Congress delegated the task of defining these exemptions to the Department of Labor, which
has from time to time enacted regulations defining and explaining these exemptions. The Department enforces
both their regulations and the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006).
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006); see also 29 C.F.R. § 541.500 (2012).
44. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
45. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text; infra Parts III.B–C.
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The broad applicability of the FLSA makes it difficult to apply to PSRs. These
employees resemble outside salesmen — the word “sales” is even included in their
title — but they are explicitly prohibited by federal law from “selling” prescription
drugs directly to physicians.46 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act governs
prescription drug sales, distribution, and advertisements, in addition to
communications about prescription drugs.47 The restrictions imposed by these laws
limit the conduct of pharmaceutical companies and PSRs and complicate the
analysis of whether pharmaceutical sales representatives actually sell. The FLSA,
however, provides little to no guidance as to how this complex statutory and
regulatory scheme affects the outside salesman exemption. The FLSA broadly
defines sales as “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment
for sale, or other disposition.”48
B. The Department of Labor Has Promulgated Rules to Explain and Expand the
FLSA’s Exemptions to Overtime Pay
Because the FLSA is a statute intended to have widespread applicability,
Department is charged with promulgating regulations to define and explain
exemptions to the FLSA’s overtime pay requirement.49 The Department
promulgated regulations about the outside salesman exemption50 and
administrative employee exemption,51 which the Department updated in 2004.52

the
the
has
the

46. See 21 U.S.C. § 353(c) (2006) (“No person may sell, purchase, or trade or offer to sell, purchase, or
trade any drug sample, . . . coupon, . . . [or prescription drug] . . . .”); § 353(d) (regulating the distribution of
drug samples).
47. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (2006); see 21 U.S.C. §353(c)
(establishing that no person may sell, purchase, or trade or offer to sell, purchase, or trade any drug sample,
coupon, or drug limited to prescriptions); see also 21 U.S.C. § 353(d) (regulating the distribution of drug
samples); see also Laws, Regulations, Guidances, and Enforcement Actions, FDA (last updated Apr. 30, 2009),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/DrugMarketingAdvertisi
ngandCommunications/ucm081617.htm. These laws are so extensive they even regulate drug samples and
coupons. 21 U.S.C. § 353(c).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (2006).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (delegating the task of defining the exemptions to the Secretary of the
Department of Labor).
50. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.500–541.504 (2012).
51. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.200–541.204 (2012).
52. Before this, the regulations have not been substantially changed in fifty years, and attempts to update
them in the last twenty years have been extremely controversial. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for
Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22122, 22124–25
(2004). While there were significant structural changes to the rules, in many ways the new regulations are
substantively similar to the previous regulations, and do not represent a major change in overtime regulations.
For example, two new alternative tests were proposed, but ultimately rejected, for the administrative positions
exemption: the “position of responsibility” and “high level of skill or training” tests. The Final Rule retained the
existing requirement that exempt administrative employees must exercise discretion and independent
judgment. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and
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1. Outside Salesman Exemption
The outside salesman exemption has two requirements. First, the employee must
have a primary duty to either make “sales,” as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 203(k), or to
acquire orders or contracts for services for consideration paid by the customer.53
Second, the employee must customarily and regularly perform work away from the
employer’s office.54
The contested requirement of this exemption is whether PSRs “sell.” Both the
statutory and regulatory definitions broadly define the term to include “any sale,
exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other
disposition.”55 The regulations build on the statutory definition by stating: “Sales
within the meaning of section 3(k) of the Act include the transfer of title to tangible
property, and in certain cases, of tangible and valuable evidences of intangible
property.”56 The Department’s Final Rule did not clarify the definition of sales,
explaining only “that the employee [must have], in some sense, . . . made sales.”57
There is limited other relevant guidance to determine whether PSRs make sales.
Generally, the Department has explained that if an employee has a primary duty of
obtaining a commitment to buy from a customer and is credited with the sale, then
the employee is selling.58 The Department has also provided that technological
changes in how orders are placed should not ultimately determine whether an
employee is selling, but the Final Rule did not discuss how regulatory limitations on
prescription drugs affect how “orders” must necessarily happen in the

Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. at 22123. One significant change, however, was the adoption of a single duties
test. The new regulations adopted a single standard duties test for each exemption category. 69 Fed. Reg. at
22126.
53. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(a)(1)(i)–(ii). The FLSA defines “sale” or “sell” to include “any sale, exchange,
contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (2006).
54. 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(a)(2). This is the “outside” component of the outside salesman exemption. The
proposed regulations for the 2004 Rules required the employer to perform work unrelated to outside sales for
more than twenty percent of the hours worked in a workweek by nonexempt employees of the employer. 69
Fed. Reg. at 22160. The Department decided that the primary duty test was preferable to the twenty percent
tolerance test. Id. at 22161.
55. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (defining selling as “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for
sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition”), with 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (“Sales within the meaning of section
3(k) of the Act include the transfer of title to tangible property, and in certain cases, of tangible and valuable
evidences of intangible property. Section 3(k) of the Act states that ‘sale’ or ‘sell’ includes any sale, exchange,
contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.”).
56. 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b).
57. 69 Fed. Reg. at 22162 (emphasis added).
58. 69 Fed. Reg. at 22162–63. This statement was made within the context of buyer-consumers placing
orders with a company directly because exempt status should not depend on whether it is the sales employee or
the customer who types the order into a computer system and hits the return button. 69 Fed. Reg. at 22162–63.
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pharmaceutical industry.59 Lastly, the regulations distinguish promotional work
performed by an employee that is incidental to and in conjunction with sales or
solicitations, from promotional work that is designed to stimulate sales in general.
Work performed incidental to and in conjunction with sales is exempted work (and
considered to be part of sales), but work designed to stimulate sales in general is not
exempted work.60
2. The Components of the Administrative Employee Exemption and How the Third
Circuit Applied the Exemption to PSRs
The administrative employee exemption applies to an “employee employed in a
bona fide . . . administrative . . . capacity . . . .”61 The regulation explaining the
administrative employee exemption promulgated by the Department has three
major components. First, the employee must earn more than $455 per week.62
Second, the employee must have a primary duty of performing “office or nonmanual work directly related to the management or general business operations of
the employer or the employer’s customers.”63 Third, the employee’s primary duty
from the second requirement must involve the “exercise of discretion and
independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.”64 Furthermore, in
order to be directly related to the management or general business operations, the
work must directly relate “to assisting with the running or servicing of the
business,” as opposed to selling a product in a store.65 Examples of such work
include, but are not limited to, advertising, marketing, and public relations.66
The regulations explain what it means to exercise “discretion and independent
judgment with respect to matters of significance.”67 This requirement establishes the
relative importance of the employee’s work, and establishes several factors that can
be used to evaluate the discretionary nature of the work: whether the employee has
authority to formulate, affect, interpret, or implement management policies or
59. 69 Fed. Reg. at 22162–63 (“[T]he Department agrees that technological changes in how orders are
taken and processed should not preclude the exemption for employees who in some sense make the sales.”).
Pharmaceutical companies use “detailers” (or PSRs) to promote their prescription drugs by providing
information to physicians about the company’s drugs in hopes of persuading the physicians to write
prescriptions for the products to their patients in appropriate cases. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2653, 2659 (2011) (describing the process of “detailing”). Patients ultimately purchase these prescriptions at a
pharmacy, which receives the drugs from the manufacturer.
60. 29 C.F.R. § 541.503 (2012).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006).
62. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(1) (2012).
63. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(2).
64. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(3).
65. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a) (2012).
66. 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(b).
67. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202 (2012).
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operating practices; whether the employee carries out major assignments in
conducting the operations of the business; and whether the employee has authority
to waive or deviate from established policies and procedures without prior
approval.68 In summation, the employee must have the “authority to make an
independent choice, free from immediate direction or supervision.”69
The Third Circuit applied these regulations to PSRs in Smith v. Johnson &
Johnson and held that PSRs were exempted from overtime pay as administrative
employees, based on the determination that that PSRs’ jobs had sufficient
independent and managerial qualities to satisfy the exemption’s requirements.70 In
coming to this conclusion, the court noted that the FLSA is construed broadly as a
remedial statute and exemptions to it are construed narrowly against the
employer.71
In Smith, the parties both agreed that Smith’s salary met the minimum
requirement for the administrative employee exemption, and the dispute between
the parties was over the nature and execution of Smith’s duties.72 The court relied
on Smith’s testimony about the managerial and independent qualities of her
position to conclude that her job satisfied the other two requirements. The court
determined that Smith’s position “directly related to the management or general
business operations of the employer” because her non-manual position required
her to form a strategic plan designed to maximize sales in her territory.73 These tasks
“involved a high level of planning and foresight, and the strategic plan guided the

68. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(a) (explaining the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to
matters of significance). Section 541.202 clarifies the definition of discretion and independent judgment to
reflect existing federal case law and to eliminate outdated and confusing language in the existing interpretive
guidelines. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 22142; 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b) (laying out the factors).
69. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(c).
70. Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2010). In Smith, the only issue addressed by
the Third Circuit was whether the administrative employee exemption applied to pharmaceutical sales
representatives. Id. at 286 n.4. The district court found the outside salesman exemption did not apply. Smith v.
Johnson & Johnson, No. 06-4787 (JLL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104952 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2008), order aff’d, appeal
dismissed, 593 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2010), at *21.
71. Smith, 593 F.3d at 284 (citing Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008)). This
is a canon of construction for the FLSA because it is a remedial statute designed to improve wages and working
conditions; therefore, its provisions are to be construed broadly in favor of coverage. Tennessee Coal, Iron &
Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944) (explaining that portions of the FLSA are
“remedial and humanitarian in purpose” and that “[s]uch a statute must not be interpreted or applied in a
narrow, grudging manner”).
72. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a) (2012) (requiring for the administrative employee exemption that an
employee have a minimum salary of $455 per week, have a primary duty of performing office or non-manual
worked directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s
customers, and where the execution of that primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent
judgment with respect to matters of significance).
73. Smith, 593 F.3d at 285.
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execution of her remaining duties.”74 The court also found that Smith exercised
discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance in the
performance of her duties because Smith worked without direct oversight and was
“the manager of her own business who could run her own territory as she saw fit.”75
C. The Second Circuit and the Department Agreed That Neither Exemption Applied to
PSRs
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was the second modern
federal appellate court to address the issue of overtime pay for PSRs in In re
Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation.76 For the first time, the Department joined the
litigation by filing a brief as amicus curiae, arguing that neither exemption applied.
The Department asserted that no sale occurred between PSRs and physicians and
that PSRs did not exercise enough discretion and independent judgment.77 The
Second Circuit held that the Department was owed controlling deference and that
neither the administrative employee exemption nor the outside salesman
exemption applied to PSRs.78
1. Levels of Deference Owed to the Department When Interpreting Its Regulations
There are three different kinds of administrative deference. First, Chevron deference
applies to agency interpretations that carry out an express or implied delegation by
Congress to the agency to interpret an ambiguous statute through rules carrying the
force of law. Second, Auer deference applies to an agency interpretation of the
agency’s own ambiguous regulations. Third, Skidmore deference is a low-level, nonbinding deference.
Chevron deference applies when Congress has delegated legislative authority to
an administrative agency to interpret an ambiguous statute through rules carrying
the force of law. When administrative action is taken as an exercise of that
legislative authority, the action is entitled to binding Chevron deference, unless the
action was procedurally defective, substantively arbitrary or capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.79 In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
74.

Id.
Id.
76. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), abrogated by Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
77. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 5–6.
78. In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 143–44.
79. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). Most cases where agency rules have received
Chevron deference, those rules were subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking. United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 228, 230 (2001). However, there are a number of cases where Chevron deference has been applied
even where notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures were not followed. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 590–91
(Scalia, J., concurring) (listing cases in which the Court has accorded Chevron deference to authoritative agency
75.
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Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court laid out a two-part test to determine
whether an agency’s interpretation is owed controlling deference.80 If Congress’s
formulation of the statute clearly and directly addresses the issue, then the statute
controls. However, if the statute is ambiguous, then the court must determine
“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”81 So long as the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, the agency’s
interpretation is owed controlling deference.
Auer deference applies when an agency is interpreting its own ambiguous
regulation using “the agency’s fair and considered judgment . . . .”82 Under Auer, an
agency opinion in an amicus brief is owed controlling deference so long as the
interpretation is not plainly erroneous or otherwise unreasonable.83 The
interpretation may not be a “post hoc rationalization” to justify past agency action.84
Finally, in Gonzales v. Oregon, the Court explained that Auer deference does not
apply when an agency merely paraphrases statutory language in a regulation instead
of using its expertise and experience to formulate regulations.85
Agency interpretations that do not receive controlling deference under Chevron
or Auer may still be “entitled to respect” under Skidmore. The amount of deference
applied under Skidmore depends on the thoroughness of the agency’s
considerations, the validity of its reasoning, the consistency of the interpretation
with past agency opinions and actions, and all other factors which give it the “power
to persuade.”86

positions). The Court has explicitly acknowledged that notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures are not
required to be awarded Chevron deference. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230–31.
80. 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
81. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
82. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997).
83. Id. at 461–62 (explaining that the fact the Department’s reasonable interpretation came in the form of a
legal brief did not, under the circumstances of the case, make it unworthy of controlling deference, combined
with the fact it was not plainly erroneous); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 878 (2011). But see
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (explaining that agency interpretations that lack the force of law — such as those
“contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines” — “do not warrant Chevronstyle [controlling] deference”).
84. Auer, 519 U.S. at 462 (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988)). The
existence of other regulations, rulings, or administrative practices that are consistent with the interpretation
weigh in favor of an interpretation meriting Auer deference. See Bowen, 488 U.S. at 212.
85. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (“An agency does not acquire special authority to
interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has
elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.”).
86. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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2. The Second Circuit Held That the Department’s Opinion That Neither Exemption
Applied Is Owed Controlling Deference
The Second Circuit held the Department’s interpretation for both exemptions was
owed Auer deference because an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is
generally entitled to controlling deference.87 The court reasoned that neither the
outside salesman exemption nor the administrative employee exemption applied
because federal law prohibits PSRs from selling prescription drugs and there was
“no evidence in the record that [PSRs] have any authority to formulate, affect,
interpret, or implement Novartis’s management policies or its operating
practices . . . .”88 Additionally, the court noted that, in general, exemptions to the
FLSA overtime requirement were to be narrowly construed against the employer.89
The Department of Labor sided with the PSRs and argued the exemptions did
not apply to PSRs, thereby requiring employers to pay overtime under the FLSA.
Firstly, the Department explained that the FLSA’s “exemptions are to be narrowly
construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application
limited to those [cases] plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit.”90
Secondly, the Department argued that its opinion was owed Auer deference despite
that it was presented in an amicus brief.91
The Department argued the administrative employee exemption could not apply
to PSRs because the exercise of discretion and independent judgment must be more

87. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2010). In Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, the
court acknowledged that the Secretary’s regulations have controlling weight under Chevron, unless found to be
arbitrary and capricious. 593 F.3d 280, 284 (3d Cir. 2010). However, the Department did not file an amicus
brief in that case and therefore the court did not consider the Department’s opinion about whether PSRs
specifically are eligible for overtime pay.
88. In re Novartis, 611 F.3d at 156. Novartis did not show the PSRs were allowed discretion or independent
judgment, since PSRs gained skills from Novartis trainings and were exercised with severe limits. Id. at 156–57.
89. Id. at 150 (quoting Bilyou v. Dutchess Beer Distributors, Inc., 300 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 2002)
(quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960)).
90. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 7 (quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392
(1960)) (alteration in the brief).
91. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 7 n.3 (“To the extent that the plain language of the
Department’s outside sales or administrative regulations are ambiguous, courts must give controlling deference
to the Department’s interpretation of its own regulations unless such interpretation is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with those regulations.”); see Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147, 1155 (2008)
(“Just as we defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretations of the statute when it issues regulations in the first
instance . . . the agency is entitled to further deference when it adopts a reasonable interpretation of regulations
it has put in force. Under Auer, we accept the agency’s position unless it is ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation.’” (citations omitted)); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). This principle holds true
whether the Department’s interpretation is found in a Preamble to a Final Rule published in the Federal
Register, an opinion letter or other interpretive materials, or in a legal brief. See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home,
Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 (2007) (controlling deference given to Department’s Advisory Memorandum
issued during the course of litigation); Auer, 519 U.S. at 462 (controlling deference given to legal brief).
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than the use of skill in applying well established techniques, procedures, or specific
standards set forth by the employer in manuals or other sources.92 While PSRs work
independently, determine what time of day to visit the physicians on their lists, and
decide how best to execute their presentations, they do so within clearly and strictly
prescribed parameters.93 For example, when promoting the drugs to physicians,
PSRs are not allowed to deviate from the “core message” found in the scripts,
manuals, brochures, and other materials provided by the employer.94 If PSRs do not
have a scripted response to a physician’s question, they are required to either
reiterate the “core message” or refer the physician to the employer’s medical
experts.95 The Department contended that an employee so tightly constrained
cannot exercise discretion and independent judgment.96
The Department also argued PSRs do not qualify for the outside salesman
exemption. The Department contended that while PSRs’ work might resemble
selling, they do not in fact make sales, as the actual sale of the drugs occurs between
the company and distributors (and then to the pharmacy).97 The regulations defined
sales as “the transfer of title to tangible property, and in certain cases, of tangible
and valuable evidences of intangible property.”98 The Department concluded that
PSRs only engage in non-exempt promotional work and, therefore, do not satisfy
the primary duties test for the outside salesman exemption.99

IV. The Court’s Reasoning
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, affirming the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that the “petitioners qualify as outside salesmen
under the most reasonable interpretation of the [Department]’s regulations.”100
The Court first addressed the issue of whether the Department was owed
controlling deference for the opinion set forth in its amicus brief: that an employee
does not make a “sale” for the purposes of the outside salesman exemption unless
the employee actually transfers title to the property at issue.101 First, the Court
recognized that agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations usually receive

92.

29 C.F.R. § 541.202(e) (2012); see also Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 19.
Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 21.
94. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 6.
95. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 4 n.2 (“If a Rep does not have a scripted response from NPC to
a physician’s concerns, she must try to ‘sidestep’ the question by restating the ‘core message’ or refer the
physician to medical experts and NPC.” (citation omitted)).
96. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 6.
97. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 3 n.1.
98. 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (2012); see also Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 8–10.
99. Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 9–10.
100. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2174 (2012).
101. Id. at 2166.
93.
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controlling Auer deference, even when advanced in a legal brief.102 The Court,
however, rejected the Department’s interpretation. The Court concluded that
allowing this interpretation of an ambiguous regulation to retroactively apply to
conduct pre-dating that interpretation “would seriously undermine the principle
that agencies should provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of the conduct [a
regulation] prohibits or requires.’”103 The Court noted that the industry had treated
PSRs as non-exempt employees for decades and the Department had never taken
any enforcement action against any pharmaceutical company.104 Fearing the
potential for agencies to promulgate “vague and open-ended regulations that they
[could] later interpret as they see fit,” the Court declined to extend Auer
deference.105
The Court applied Skidmore deference, which accords agencies a level of
deference consistent with the “thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade.”106 The Court found the
Department’s opinion to be “quite unpersuasive,” as it “plainly lack[ed] the
hallmarks of thorough consideration.”107 Explicitly, the Court took issue with the
fact that the Department’s reasoning for its position had changed over the course of
the litigation in the Second and Ninth Circuits and then before the Court.108 The
Court determined the Department’s title transfer theory was “flatly inconsistent”
with the “consignment for sale” definition of “sale” within the FLSA.109
Finding the Department’s opinion was entitled to no deference, the Court
turned to traditional methods of statutory interpretation and used a textual analysis
to determine that Christopher and Buchanan were indeed exempted from overtime

102.

Id. at 2166 (citing Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011)).
Id. at 2167 (citing Gates & Fox Co. v. OSHRC, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.))
(alteration in Court opinion).
104. Id. at 2168.
105. Id. It is plausible that agencies are intentionally drafting “vague and open-ended regulations” as an
enforcement strategy due to limited budgets.
106. Id. at 2168–69 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (quoting Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))).
107. Id. at 2169; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (explaining that the factors to
evaluate when determining deference owed to an administrative opinion include: “the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”).
108. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2169 (“[T]he DOL first announced its view that pharmaceutical sales
representatives do not qualify as outside salesmen in a series of amicus briefs, there was no opportunity for
public comment, and the interpretation that initially emerged from the Department’s internal decisionmaking
process proved to be untenable. After arguing successfully in the Second Circuit and then unsuccessfully in the
Ninth Circuit that a sale for present purposes simply requires a ‘consummated transaction,’ the DOL advanced
a different interpretation in this Court.”).
109. Id.
103.
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pay as outside salesmen.110 The Court began by analyzing the FLSA statutory
provision establishing the exemption.111 The Court found the word “capacity” of
particular importance. The intentional use of “capacity” suggested a “functional,
rather than formal, inquiry.”112 The Court further noted that the Department
adopted the statutory definition of “sale,” which was a non-exclusive list of
examples of “sales.”113 The Court emphasized that the words “any” and “other
disposition” in the statutory definition demonstrated Congress’s intent to include a
wide range of “sales” under the exemption.114 Finally, the Court concluded that
petitioners were “selling.” The Court reasoned that the petitioners made sales
within the meaning of the FLSA by obtaining a commitment to prescribe, the only
way “selling” can exist in the pharmaceutical industry.115
In support of its conclusion, the Court also noted that the petitioners bore the
“external indicia” of outside salesmen, because the petitioners: (1) “were trained to
close each sales call by obtaining the maximum commitment possible from the
physician;” (2) “worked away from the office, with minimal supervision;” and (3)
“were rewarded for their efforts with incentive compensation.”116 The Court found
further support for its conclusion due to the nature of the petitioners’ jobs and
salaries. Specifically, their work was difficult to standardize to a particular time
frame, making them unlike typical hourly workers entitled to overtime pay, and
they earned salaries well above the minimum wage.117 Overall the Court proclaimed
PSRs are “hardly the kind of employees that the FLSA was intended to protect.”118
The dissenting opinion (authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) agreed with the majority opinion on the issue
that the Department was owed no deference.119 The dissenting opinion disagreed
with the majority’s conclusions that obtaining a nonbinding commitment from a
physician was “selling” and that a “sale” could happen between a PSR and a

110. Id. at 2170–73 (analyzing the text of the FLSA and related regulations, focusing on the definition of
“sale,” the modifier “any” in that definition, and the use of the broad catchall phrase: “other dispositions”).
111. Id. at 2170; see also 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006) (“[A]ny employee employed . . . in the capacity of
outside salesman . . . .”).
112. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2170.
113. Id. at 2170–71; 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (defining selling as “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment
for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition”).
114. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2170–71.
115. Id. at 2172 (“Obtaining a nonbinding commitment from a physician to prescribe one of respondent’s
drugs is the most that petitioners were able to do to ensure the eventual disposition of the products that
respondent sells.”).
116. Id. at 2172–73.
117. Id. at 2173.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2175 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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physician.120 The dissenters opined that the PSRs’ work was more comparable to
“promotional activities designed to stimulate sales” and that the PSRs’ “primary
duty” was to provide information, not sell.121 The dissenting Justices would have
held that PSRs are not outside salesmen, and thus entitled to overtime pay.122

V. Analysis
The Court in Christopher reached the proper conclusion about whether the outside
salesman exemption applies to PSRs, but did so in a way that eroded agencies’
previously-recognized ability to offer controlling administrative interpretations in
legal briefs. The Court should have declined to apply controlling deference using
Gonzales rather than emphasizing a “fair notice” standard. However, the
Department’s opinion that PSRs were not outside salesmen was not sound given the
Department’s other regulations and explanations of the exemption. Therefore, the
Court’s ultimate conclusion that PSRs are exempted from overtime pay as outside
salesmen was well founded.
The impact of the Court’s decision is that, going forward, courts will be able to
dismiss agency opinions using the “fair warning” standard simply because there are
one or more permissible interpretations of an ambiguous regulation, and cite lack
of notice as the basis for not awarding deference. The Court has effectively limited
Auer deference to only those interpretations that pre-date the challenged issue or
those interpretations based on clearly drafted regulations. As a result, Auer
deference will not apply to agency opinions of ambiguous regulations, which is
precisely when the agency’s opinion matters most.
To demonstrate, the Christopher Court held that the Department’s opinion was
not owed controlling deference regarding the applicability of the outside salesman
exemption to PSRs due to lack of “fair notice” (when the Department’s regulations
were ambiguous and basically restated the FLSA). Contrastingly, the Court would
have found that the Department’s opinion as to the applicability of the
administrative employee exemption would be owed Auer deference if it had granted
review on a writ of certiorari to In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation. Because the
administrative employee exemption regulations are very detailed and expand upon
and explain the administrative employee exemption in the FLSA, the Department
had garnered special authority to interpret them. By granting certiorari on the
Ninth Circuit case as opposed to the Second Circuit decision, the Court avoided

120. Id. at 2176. Justice Breyer noted explained that sales in the pharmaceutical industry happened between
the consumer and the pharmacist. Further, Justice Breyer noted that a patient may choose not to fill a
prescription, or that a pharmacist may substitute a generic for the manufacturer’s drug. Id.
121. Id. at 2177–78.
122. Id. at 2179. On a practical note, some would not find it surprising that the four liberal justices decided
that the exemption does not apply, thus making PSRs entitled to overtime pay.

Vol. 8 2013

39

Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.
clearly demonstrating the negative impact of its decision on the power of amici
briefs by administrative agencies.
A. By Limiting the Scope of Its Review the Supreme Court Hid the Deleterious
Implications for Auer Deference for Administrative Agencies’ Amici Briefs
The Court chose not to address whether PSRs qualified for the administrative
employee exemption to overtime pay.123 The petition for writ of certiorari from the
Second Circuit was denied after the Ninth Circuit decision was released.124
Therefore, it is likely that the Supreme Court was aware of the three-way circuit
split on the two exemptions and the deference issue when it denied the petition
from the Second Circuit.
By granting certiorari on the Ninth Circuit decision, the Court limited its review
to only the issues of the outside salesman exemption and the level of deference
owed to the Department on that specific exemption.125 While the Supreme Court
decision on the applicability of the outside salesman exemption to PSRs resolved
the practical question of whether PSRs are entitled to overtime pay, the Court
avoided addressing the administrative employee exemption portion of the circuit
split and downplayed the implication of its decision for the use of Auer deference in
the future.
B. The Department’s Opinion as to the Outside Sales Employee Exemption Is Not
Owed Controlling Deference, but the Department’s Opinion Regarding the
Administrative Employee Exemption Should Receive Auer Deference
The Department is the administrator of the FLSA and properly promulgated
regulations to define the exemptions established by statute.126 The regulations
themselves are, therefore, at a minimum, awarded Chevron deference.127 However,

123. While a decision that at least one of the exemptions applied to PSRs resolved the immediate question of
overtime pay, limiting the Court’s inquiry to only one exemption left the other half of the administrative
deference question unanswered: what happens when the administrative regulations are clear? As the analysis
section of the case note explains, the Court avoided clearly demonstrating of the impact of its decision: reducing
the authority of agencies to advance interpretations of ambiguous regulations in legal briefs, exactly when
agency opinion is needed most.
124. The Ninth Circuit issued their opinion on Feb. 14, 2011. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
635 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012). The Supreme Court scheduled the Second Circuit
case for conference Feb. 18, 2011 and Feb. 25, 2001, denying cert on February 28th. Docket No. 10-460, SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-460.htm
(last visited Jan. 26, 2013).
125. See Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Lopes, 131 S. Ct. 1568 (2011) (denying the petition for writ of
certiorari); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 760 (2011).
126. 29 U.S.C. § 204 (2006) (naming the Department of Labor as the administrator of the FLSA).
127. See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2165.
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the Court held the Department’s opinion in the brief about the outside salesman
exemption was not entitled to controlling Auer deference, primarily because of the
lack of “fair warning.”128 The concern of “post hoc rationalization”129 or contriving a
“convenient litigating position”130 is not new. The administrative rulemaking
process of requiring both notice and comment was created to specifically avoid it.131
However, the Court did not need to expand this train of thought in order to decline
to apply Auer deference.132
The Court could and should have refused to apply Auer deference by using the
reasoning set out in Gonzales. The regulation defining sales analyzed under the
outside salesman exemption merely parrots the language of the FLSA,133 and the
latter part of the regulation actually repeats the FLSA definition of sales.134 Because
the regulation only reiterates the FLSA, rather than expanding upon what the FLSA
states, the Department’s opinion was owed no deference under Gonzales.135 The
result of the reasoning in the Christopher decision is that it will limit agencies’
previously-recognized ability to interpret ambiguous regulations in amici briefs
when the interpretations are neither formally promulgated rules nor obviously
based on the regulations themselves, defeating the purpose of this recognized ability
to offer interpretations in briefs. This limitation is particularly unfortunate in a time
of limited enforcement budgets given that amici briefs cost less money and utilize
fewer resources.

128.

Id. at 2167.
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997).
130. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988).
131. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2167 (citing Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170–71
(2007)). Notice-and-comment procedures not only ensure fairness for regulated parties, but also operate as a
check on agency-power. See Elana Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2262 (2001)
(explaining how the APA basically operates as a check on executive power “by subjecting [agencies’] most
important lawmaking mechanisms — rulemakings and (especially) adjudications — to stringent procedural
requirements”).
132. Auer deference is determined by a number of factors, or which “adequacy of notice to the regulated
parties” is but one. Id. at 2167 (citing Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 158 (1991) (identifying “adequacy of
notice to regulated parties” as one factor relevant to the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation)).
133. The regulation actually references the statutory definition. 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(a)(1)(i) (2012)
(explaining the employee must have a primary duty of “making sales within the meaning of section 3(k) of the
Act”).
134. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (defining selling as “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for
sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition”), with 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (2012) (“Sales within the meaning of
section 3(k) of the Act include the transfer of title to tangible property, and in certain cases, of tangible and
valuable evidences of intangible property. Section 3(k) of the Act states that ‘sale’ or ‘sell’ includes any sale,
exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.”).
135. When an agency merely paraphrases statutory language in a regulation, instead of using its expertise
and experience to formulate regulations which expand upon the statute, the agency does not acquire special
authority to interpret its own words and is not owed any deference. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257
(2006).
129.
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In contrast, the administrative employee exemption demonstrates how an
agency opinion in a legal brief might still be owed Auer deference after Christopher.
An agency’s opinion will still be owed controlling deference when the regulations
are clear on their face. For example, the regulations defining the administrative
employee exemption expand upon the FLSA’s one time mention of employees
“employed in a bona fide administrative capacity.” From this, the Department
created a three-part test analyzing salary, nature of the work, and the execution of
that work.136 The Department’s regulations are very specific as to the requirements
of an exempted administrative employee, demonstrating that the regulations were
formulated with the Department’s experience and expertise. In turn, this means the
Department’s opinion that PSRs are not exempt should be owed controlling
deference.137
C. Outside Sales Employee Exemption Regulations Are Ambiguous, with Two
Permissible Interpretations as Applied to PSRs, and Are Thus Inappropriate for Auer
Deference Under Christopher
The Court properly found that the outside salesman exemption applied to PSRs.
The Court noted the broad definition of “sales” and how PSRs “sell” in the only way
“selling” can exist in the pharmaceutical industry.138 The Court also noted other
considerations, such as: how the nature of a PSR’s work is similar to the work of a
traditional outside salesman, that a PSR’s salary and incentive pay do not warrant
overtime pay, and that all the rationales for exempting an outside sales employee
apply.139 However, the regulations promulgated by the Department offered little
guidance on these issues, making Auer deference inapplicable to the Department’s
amicus brief under Gonzales.140
1. The Court Mistakenly Denied Auer Deference by Categorizing the Transfer of Title
Interpretation as New When It Was Already Established and Reasonable Grounds
Existed for Finding No Sale Occurs During PSR Detailing
The regulations require outside salesmen to make “sales” and perform their work
primarily outside the employer’s place of business (both obvious from the title of
the exemption set forth in the FLSA).141 PSRs clearly meet the requirement of
working primarily outside the employer’s place of business, because PSRs mostly

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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See 29 C.F.R. § 541.200 (2012).
See supra Part III.C.
Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2174.
Id. at 2172–73, 2179.
See supra Part III.C.
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006), with 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(a) (2012).
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work from home or are traveling to visit physicians.142 During this time, PSRs are
largely unsupervised, like a typical outside sales employee.143 Therefore, the only
issue for deliberation is whether PSRs “sell.”144
It is not implausible to conclude that PSRs sell because selling is defined broadly
by both the FLSA and regulations.145 As the Court noted, the definitions conclude
with a catch-all, “or other disposition,” after a list of examples of selling.146
However, it is a mischaracterization to say the Department’s title transfer theory
was new and that, therefore, companies had no notice. In fact, the title transfer
theory was the only addition made to the FLSA’s definition of “sales” in the
regulatory definition.147 While transfer of title may appear “flatly inconsistent” with
a definition of sales that include consignment for sales, that is not the case. The
Court cites Sturm v. Boker to support the proposition that “‘consignment for sale’
does not involve the transfer of title.”148 This statement oversimplifies the issue.
There is ultimately a transfer of title in consignment for sale, just not between the
consignor and the consignee, but between the consignor and the buyer when the
purchase occurs.
A few reasons make it illogical for the Court to claim that the Department
“[could] not salvage its [transfer of title] interpretation” by arguing that
consignment for sale eventually results in a title transfer, because the same could be
said of physician’s nonbinding commitment.149 First, this rationalization ignores the
realities that a PSR’s interactions with physicians are not equivalent to those
interactions that occur under consignment for sale. In a consignment analogy, the
most logical assignment of roles to each party would be that the manufacturer
would be the consignor, the pharmacy would be the consignee, and the patientpurchaser would be the ultimate buyer. One might argue that PSRs are agents of the
consignor and that physicians are consignees in the sense that the physicians
operate in cooperation with pharmacists. However, the physician, the party

142.

See 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(a)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 541.502 (2012).
See Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, 118 F.2d 202, 207–08 (10th Cir. 1941) (explaining that a typical outside
salesman works independently, receives commission as extra compensation, and “works away from his
employer’s place of business, is not subject to the personal supervision of his employer, and his employer has no
way of knowing the number of hours he works per day”).
144. See supra Part III.B.1.
145. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (defining selling as “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for
sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition”), with 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b) (2012) (“Sales within the meaning of
section 3(k) of the Act include the transfer of title to tangible property, and in certain cases, of tangible and
valuable evidences of intangible property. Section 3(k) of the Act states that ‘sale’ or ‘sell’ includes any sale,
exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.”).
146. Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2171.
147. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
148. Id. at 2169 (citing Sturm v. Boker, 150 U.S. 312, 330 (1893)).
149. Id.
143.
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arguably being “sold” to by a PSR, is not involved in the title transfer. The
consignees never receive title, and therefore no sale occurs between the PSR and
physician under this analogy.
Second, the consignment relationship is not when the sale occurs; the sale (and
title transfer) occurs when the consignee sells to the purchaser. Indeed, the Sturm
Court specifically explained that the term of the consignment was that “the
property was committed or entrusted to [the consignee from the consignor] for
care or sale, and did not by any express or fair implication mean the sale by the one
or purchase by the other.”150 In PSR detailing, prescription drugs are never
“committed or entrusted” to physicians and are certainly not “sold” by
physicians.151 Put simply, pharmacies, not physicians, sell prescription drugs.
The argument that title must ultimately transfer for a “sale” to occur is not fatal
to the Department’s argument. In fact, this assertion proves the logic of the
Department’s argument that PSRs do not sell to physicians. (The author recognizes
that this conclusion is counterintuitive given the context of the Department’s other
regulations and explanations of the outside salesman exemption, which appear to
exempt PSRs from overtime pay.) Because the logic of the title transfer theory holds
as applied to PSRs, the Court should have denied application of Auer deference
using Gonzales rather than arguing the Department’s opinion was a novel and
erroneous interpretation.
2. The Court Accurately Concluded that PSRs Qualify as Outside Salesmen, a
Permissible Result Because the Department’s Regulations Were Ambiguous
The fact that the Department’s title theory is neither new nor incorrect does not
indicate that PSRs cannot reasonably be said to “sell” under the FLSA and the
Department’s ambiguous regulations. The argument set forth above merely
demonstrates that the lack of “fair warning” emphasized by the Court was a
misguided way to dismiss the Department’s authority to interpret an ambiguous
regulation. The broad statutory and regulatory definitions include “selling” as it
exists in the pharmaceutical industry.
The Final Rule from the Department expansively defined sales by stating that the
employer only has to prove “that the employee, in some sense, has made sales.”152
Furthermore, the promotional aspect of a PSR’s job does not mean that a PSR is not
selling. Detailing work is more than just promotional work to stimulate sales in
general. Rather, detailing work is done to increase an individual PSR’s personal
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Sturm v. Boker, 150 U.S. 312, 326 (1893) (emphasis added).
Physicians, more correctly put, recommend drugs by prescribing them, at which point patients can
choose to purchase or not purchase, and even if they do, pharmacist may substitute a generic version of the
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success in obtaining a commitment to prescribe. Under the regulations,
promotional work done in order to consummate an employee’s own “sales” are
exempt from overtime pay.153
The critical inquiry to determine if a PSR’s promotional work is exempt depends
upon whether the promotional work involves obtaining a commitment to
prescribe, which impacts a PSR’s commission. A physician’s lack of participation in
the transfer is irrelevant to the issue. The determinative factor under the
Department’s regulations is that PSRs are paid bonuses and commission based on
their apparent success rates for obtaining commitments to prescribe in their
respective regions. The Court also recognized PSRs received incentive
compensation like traditional outside salesmen.154
PSRs are also not the type of employee the FLSA sought to protect because of
their salary and bonus compensation structure.155 Most PSRs earn sizeable incomes
— as much as $100,000 a year — and are not “hourly workers” who work only forty
hours a week.156 The regulations explicitly state that a highly compensated employee
is more likely to be exempt from overtime pay.157 Furthermore, PSRs do not need
overtime pay to fairly compensate them for their work. PSRs receive fair
compensation for extra efforts through bonuses or commissions.158 Instead of
receiving overtime pay, a PSR receives commission for good job performance or for
extra work rendered, determined by the level of drug sales in their respective
region.159

153. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.503 (2012) (“Promotional work that is actually performed incidental to and in
conjunction with an employee’s own outside sales or solicitations is exempt work.” (emphasis added)).
154. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2173 (2012).
155. Id.
156. Christopher, 635 F.3d at 388 (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 08 Civ. 1498
(FJM), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108992, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2009)).
157. “A high level of compensation is a strong indicator of an employee’s exempt status, thus eliminating
the need for a detailed analysis of the employee’s job duties.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.601 (c) (2012). While this is quote
from the part of the regulations for a separate highly compensated employee exemption (and exemption that is
related to the administrative employee exemption), the logic nonetheless applies to all exemptions. The FLSA
was enacted in order to protect underpaid and overworked working class. See Roosevelt, supra note 40
(explaining how the FLSA will prevent “chiseling workers’ wagers [and] stretching workers’ hours”). If an
employee is already being paid a large amount of money, that employees does not need overtime. PSRs earn an
average of $91,500 a year, far above minimum wage. In re Novartis, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 642.
158. PSRs earn an average of $91,500, where generally fifteen percent to twenty-five percent of that consists
of “incentive pay.” In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 593 F. Supp. 2d 637, 642 (S.D.N.Y 2009), vacated and
remanded by 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010), abrogated by Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct.
2156 (2012).
159. Bonuses are based on subscriptions generated within a PSR’s given region, but the data is not 100%
accurate. It is impossible to track which physicians are responsible for the prescriptions and the employing
pharmaceutical company only gets data from pharmacies which choose to report to them. In re Novartis Wage
& Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2010).
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While the Court appropriately found that PSRs are outside salesmen for the
purpose of the exemption, the Court dismissed the Department’s authority with
damaging consequences. Courts will now be able to easily dismiss agency opinion
by merely pointing to the “fair warning” standard developed in Christopher simply
because there are one or more permissible interpretations, and cite lack of notice as
the basis for not granting controlling deference.
D. The Administrative Employee Exemption Is Not Ambiguous, Does Not Apply To
PSRs, and Is Appropriate for Auer Deference Under Christopher
The administrative employee exemption, in most cases, will not apply to PSRs
because most PSRs do not exercise sufficient autonomy as required by the
regulations. Employers usually strictly confine a PSR’s discretion in order to comply
with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.160 Given the clear and unambiguous
nature of the Department’s regulations (and the resulting obvious “fair warning”),
the Christopher Court would likely find the Department’s interpretation deserving
of Auer deference. However, granting controlling deference when an agency already
has clear regulations is not important because the regulations already clearly set
forth the agency’s opinion.
1. Typical PSRs Do Not Meet All the Components of the Administrative Employee
Exemption Clearly Defined by the Regulations
The regulations set out three components to the exemption: (1) a minimum salary
of $455 per week, or $23,751 a year; (2) a primary duty existing of office or nonmanual work directly related to the management or general business operations of
the employer or the employer’s customers, where the execution of the duty requires
the employee to exercise discretion; and (3) independent judgment.161 PSRs meet
the minimum salary requirement, but are unlikely to satisfy the last two
requirements.
To meet the primary duty requirement an employee must perform work directly
related to assisting the running or servicing of the business, as opposed to
manufacturing or production.162 The regulations explicitly include work in
functional areas such as advertising, marketing, and public relations.163 The detailing
work performed by PSRs can be categorized in one, if not all, of those categories. In
fact, the Third Circuit found this requirement easily met, noting that PSRs are
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required to form strategic plans designed to maximize sales in each PSRs’ respective
territory.164
The final requirement of discretion and independent judgment is more
controversial. Employers restrain PSRs by limiting them to “scripts,” “core
messages,” and pre-approved materials. Employers must limit the latitude of their
employees because of limitations placed on the industry by federal law.165 For this
reason, PSRs are not allowed to deviate from the script given to them by employers.
Ultimately, whether a PSR exercises independent judgment is a fact-specific
determination that needs to be made on a case-by-case basis. PSRs have discretion
to determine which style and strategies to use with each physician, but it is not
unusual for PSRs to go through extensive training provided by employers in order
to learn many different kinds of skills and techniques.166 The regulations stipulate
that merely applying varying well-established skills does not constitute exercising
independent judgment.167 PSRs do have discretion about which physicians they
meet with, how often, when, and where, but employers usually set minimum
outreach requirements for which and how often physicians must be contacted.168
In conclusion, because the regulations set forth a clear and obvious test for the
administrative employee exemption, the Christopher Court would likely find “fair
warning” of the obvious outcome of the Department’s interpretation and find Auer
deference appropriate. However, such deference would be effectively meaningless
because the Department’s opinion is already clearly articulated by the regulations.

VI. Conclusion
By holding the outside salesman exemption applied to PSRs, the Supreme Court of
the United States held in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation that PSRs
are not entitled to overtime pay.169 While this is a permissible finding under the

164. Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 285 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that the requirement was
met because the business strategies developed by a PSR involve a high level of planning and foresight, and the
strategic plan that Smith developed guided the execution of her remaining duties).
165. See Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 3–4; supra notes 46–47.
166. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141, 145 (2d. Cir. 2010), abrogated by Christopher v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (“In the training program, a Rep is taught how to question
physicians to determine why they may be hesitant about prescribing Novartis products and then to offer
arguments to overcome their reluctance. Novartis instructs the Reps on four ‘social styles’ that a given
individual may have in interacting with others and teaches the Reps how to tailor their presentations to a
physician’s particular social style. Novartis has also hired consultants to observe its most successful Reps and
incorporate their techniques into the training program.”).
167. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(e) (2012) (mere “use of skill in applying well-established techniques, procedures or
specific standards described in manuals or other sources” does not constitute an employee’s exercise discretion
or independent judgment).
168. See, e.g., Brief for the Secretary, supra note 17, at 4–5.
169. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2174 (2012).
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existing laws, there is a danger in the Court’s reasoning for denying Auer deference.
Courts may now use the “fair warning” standard as grounds for denying controlling
deference to an agency for a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute
simply because there is more than one permissible interpretation, and ignore the
opinion for “lack of notice.” As a result, Christopher has the potential to degrade
administrative agencies’ previously-recognized ability to interpret ambiguous
regulations in legal briefs.
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